It is important, as with everything else, to take these developments in context. The Eritrean National Charter states: “Eritrea [shall] coexist in harmony and cooperation with its neighbors by contributing, to the extent of its capability, to regional and global peace, security and development.” Water is the very source of life, and unlike its fellow riparian states, Sudan and Egypt do not have sufficient annual rainfall to sustain their populations. (The other riparian states are Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda) As a strategic resource, the Nile has the potential to cause conflict.

Egypt’s position on the use of the Nile river is assumed to have remained unchanged since the fall of President Mubarak, who followed a tough line towards Ethiopia. The position however seems to be softening – it has been suggested that Ethiopia’s sustainability studies, for it’s “Grand Renaissance Dam,” are woefully incomplete.² The consequence of the dam, if it is as unsustainable has it seems, is that some 90 million Egyptians could be left without water. Of course, water rights is far from a novel subject – in fact in the United States, the subject is similarly fraught.

Throughout the eastern United States, water is flush and the frameworks for its use is permissive. Riparian flows on the eastern seaboard are relatively stable and perennial, leaving users without much to guess with regards to future flows. As a result, users are regarded as equals. In the western United States however, water is far more scarce, with flows alternating between high and low with irregularity. In spite of this conflict has been limited by creating an equitable framework – here, there is an order to water rights, “first in/first out.” The principal here is that the senior user should appropriate his usage right in full before the junior user. Water waste is curtailed by limitations imposed by the State Water Engineer, who may limit water draw based on the beneficial use of the draw.

In this context, it is clear that the latter, “first in/first out” system, would be more appropriate for the Nile Basin as the flow is variable and water is otherwise scarce. Egypt’s position thus, is akin to that of the western United States and therefore all members of the Nile Basin should in fact support a more equitable distribution. Here, the Nile Basin Initiative members could appoint experts to function as “State Water Engineers” and provide assessments for the appropriate distribution of use. This will lead to a more peaceful and cooperative region, an outcome Eritrea supports.

Disclaimer: This article does not constitute a legal opinion. It is provided for informational purposes alone. I am not a lawyer.

1. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46276
2. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/05/06/Egypt-drowns-in-the-Nile-water-war-.html

More important to the question of the balance between the individual’s and community’s right, what is the consequence of coercion. Typically this question is approached purely from the position of the individual’s fear of coercion by the community, but as the last century proved, coercion by the individual to society can be just as consequential. Neither of these approaches are effective in their extreme, as you will see below, a balance must be struck. But within what framework should this balancing occur?

Illustrative examples of the balance that must be sought can be found in the example of education benefits. Mandatory childhood education is illustrative because it shows the balancing framework that should be applied to each sector of our lives. If an individual is afforded purely individual rights to make exclusively self-servient decisions, without regard for his future or that of the community at large, there will be tremendous misallocation of human capital. Conversely, if the community at large is able to dictate the future and direction of each individual (either en masse or separately), there may too be misallocation of human resources, but more importantly, the ambition of the individual will be trapped.

What of course is necessary in the field of education is a balance of the two. By requiring a minimum level of education, society is making a choice that the harms of such a policy (e.g. lack of individual direction, negative economic output, etc.) are balanced by the multiplying effect of education on the community (e.g. increased earning capacity, improved analytic skills of complex problems, long-term thinking, etc.). This harnessing of human capital is limited by standards of education, which once achieved release the participant, while granting society the benefit of his education. Based on this balancing principle it is clear that it can be applied to a variety of other situations including:

• healthcare,
• retirement,
• police & fire protection,
• general (transportation, water, power, etc.) infrastructure,
• etc.

Of course, application of balance must take special heed of the needs of minorities. Without care, policies to benefit the majority may affect insular minorities disproportionately. This care is taken (at least in respect to Eritrea) because of the democratic position of the organization – a principle which centers on equality in access (not necessarily outcome). How do the democratic principles here lead to care for minorities? The nature of our approach to democratic access for society is based on the principle that each individual member of society is equal to any other. Because of errs of history however, we are left with a quilted society, one bearing the markers of history on class and nationality. To remedy this, our organization has set out to establish that there is “equitable distribution of wealth, services and opportunities, and special attention to be paid to the most disadvantaged sections of society.”¹ It is clear that our attention to the minorities and “disadvantaged” sections of society will require a special duty of care.

They say that politics is the art of the possible, but I would argue it is only an art in so far as much as we apply imperfect metrics to balance the interests of society and the individual. Utilizing the metrics that we have available however, we can make a difference in our future – together.

1. PFDJ National Charter, 1994

For many years, in particular the last 12 years, Eritrea has been accused of being isolationist. This is clearly contrary to the goal of contributing to global peace and development. Indeed, this is likely a misunderstanding of the fifth principle from the Eritrean National Charter, which is self-reliance. In fact, the Charter specifically notes, “Self-reliance does not mean to isolate oneself from the international community.” Clearly, the Third Congress of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice anticipated this sort of criticism and made a clear and unambiguous statement to the contrary. A similar sentiment is included in both Articles 8 & 13 of the Constitution of Eritrea (1997).¹

Self-reliance does not mean self-sufficiency, instead it means that one must develop its capabilities internally and consider critically all ideas for implementations. This occasionally means that recommendations from abroad are considered and rejected because they are found unsatisfactory. The intent of such a policy is not denigration of the others but rather promoting the national and thus social objectives of Eritrea.

These misunderstandings lead to a great deal of frustration by Eritreans around the world because this misunderstanding can easily be confused. Although many Eritreans who follow the politics of their homeland are used to such considerations, for the parachute reporter or newly interested, it can be confounding. Emblematic of this type of misunderstanding is Eritrea’s request for USAID to wrap up its mission in Eritrea.² To the uninitiated this would seem counter-intuitive, after all the express mission of USAID is “improving lives in the developing world.”³ The picture however shifts when one understand that Eritrea would rather have a relationship based on trade and not aid.⁴ Similar comments by the Minister of National Development express the same commitment with United States can be frustrated by its involvement in the region:

“We want a much stronger and more focused relationship in development with the government of the USA … There are other avenues apart from USAid where cooperation can flourish. The non-resolution of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border issue is negatively affecting the necessary cooperation and work coordination between Eritrea and the United States.”²

Such a misunderstanding within the framework of the above comments is impossible, however – it does require a more than cursory understanding of the political landscape. Such misunderstandings however occur in the opposite direction.

As described earlier, the Eritrean National Charter clearly calls on Eritrea and the community of nations to abide by all international laws and agreements in the spirit of cooperation. In 2000 when Eritrea signed both a truce and the Algiers Agreement. Since the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission in 2002 Eritreans have been waiting for its enforcement. Although in technical effect, the Government of Ethiopia has persisted in its rejection.⁵ The leaders of Eritrea and the people of Eritrea had a misunderstanding of international law, perceiving it to be fair and the implementation would be compelled by the international community. To date, it has been ignored and demonized by the international community.

Eritreans continue, however to regard international cooperation as a key objective. One might say that Eritreans are eternally romantically spellbound by interaction in community of nations in spite of history.

1. Constitution of Eritrea
2. Eritrea says banning USAID is irreversible
3. USAID: Who we are
4. Remarks by Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs
5. Press Release of November 30, 2007

Everyone has heard of Eritrea’s neighbors – Sudan and Ethiopia. Sudan is now as fractured as the former Yugoslavia, worse still war looms between the recently divorced North and South over territory and oil. Ethiopia, by who Eritrea was occupied for thirty years, is still struggling to feed its population, and worse yet our generous aid has paid for its military adventures in Somalia and ethnic cleansing on its eastern frontier. So Eritrea is in a rough neighborhood, dwarfed by all but one of its neighbors (Djibouti is Eritrea’s other neighbor, little more than a city-state), Sudan nearly 10 times more populous and Ethiopia 20 times more populous than Eritrea.

Is Eritrea really as bad as its neighbors? Eritrea certainly has its own problems, most based in the current occupation of Eritrea by Ethiopia, that it needs to deal with and which its leaders readily admit. These range from frustrated economic growth, corruption and limited opportunities. If these were the only achievements of the Eritrean people over the past twenty years of independence however, Eritrea would surely be considered one of the worst countries in the world, but of course this is only one part of the picture.

Young people are the future of every country and investment in their education is seen as a proxy for investment in the economy as a whole. Overall Eritrea’s literacy rate is 67% which is similar to that in India, however in the crucial 15-24 demographic, Eritrea’s literacy rate is estimated at nearly 89%,¹ a literacy rate close to Turkey² and South Africa (if an adult literacy rate).³ If Eritrea can maintain and press on with these improvements Eritrea could soon join the 99% club, occupied almost exclusively by the modern economies.

Similar investments are seen by the people of Eritrea in healthcare. Again, as a proxy for such investments we can look at infant mortality rates. At independence Eritrea’s rate of infant mortality was 13.6% while after two decades of training doctors, nurses and midwives and building hospitals, nursing schools and a medical school Eritrea has cut this by more than 2/3 to 4.2%. This number, although still startlingly high, again puts Eritrea not in the company of its neighbors but the far more developed economies such as India⁴ and South Africa.³ Again, Eritrea has a long way to go but its progress in healthcare is certainly impressive.

If for all these gains why are young people still leaving? For most, it is a simple question of opportunity, one the Eritrean people struggle with everyday. As described earlier, Eritrea is much smaller than Ethiopia, but given the continued occupation of Eritrean towns by the Ethiopian army, Eritrea has needed to match the Ethiopian military. Consequently, young Eritreans who have come up for military service after high school are stationed at the border for years.

But if Ethiopia can barely feed half of its burgeoning population, how can it maintain a military so large as to fortify its border with Eritrea, quell internal rebellions and engage in military adventures in Somalia? Our nation alone provides over a quarter billion dollars in aid to Ethiopia every year. Some of this aid provided for humvees that were used by Ethiopia to kill election protestors just a few years ago. On the other hand, Eritrea has shirked aid as much as possible, pledging “trade and partnership not aid.”

So how bad is Eritrea? It seems that the Eritrean people have been doing all that they could to improve their circumstances, but this has been frustrated by regional struggles. We have the power to help, not through the system of aid that has failed for half a century, but by conditioning our assistance to other countries on their making peace with their neighbors.

1. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/eritrea_statistics.html
2. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/Turkey_statistics.html
3. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/southafrica_statistics.html
4. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/india_statistics.html

This was the war fought from 1998-2000 (the other two being [in order], the Second World War and the other Eritrea’s War of Independence), and was ostensibly based on the lack of physically demarcated border. As we saw before (in part 2) the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia was delimited in the treaties between Italy and Ethiopia in 1900, 1902, and 1908. Now the Treaty of 1908 did not, unlike the previous two treaties, actually delimit points but rather gave a formula for its delimitation.²) The Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Commission took this and interpreted it such that the border which the treaty was concerned with (the Eastern portion) was suitably delimited. It was empowered to do this by the Algiers Agreement,³ and their own Rules of Procedure.⁴  ((White, Philip; “Briefing: The Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Arbitration”; Review of African Political Economy; Vol. 29, No. 92 (2002)))

This series has been dedicated to resolving, whether or not Ethiopia truly has claim to either of the Eritrean ports of Massawa or Asseb, and in particular the latter. What needs to be made most clear from the Boundary Commission conclusion by examining the relevant treaties is that the 1908 treaty (which dealt with the Eastern portion of the border) was effective. Of similar importance, is the fact that Ethiopia (as well as Eritrea) conceded that the applicable treaties would be those signed between Italy and Ethiopia by Emperor Menelik II (see part 2). Specifically the Algiers Agreement called for those three treaties meaning that Ethiopia accepted those boundaries.

This Agreement then confirmed the state of affairs that had existed for over five hundred years and now that the border has been demarcated as set forth in the statement of the Border Commission⁵ through a list of points in its Annex⁶ per the Algiers Agreement. As set forth in that said agreement at the conclusion of demarcation, “Each party shall respect the border so determined, as well as territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other party.”³ So as the 20th anniversary of Eritrea’s Independence comes and goes, Ethiopia continues to occupy what has been legally determined as sovereign Eritrean territory and as a result has effectively cordoned itself off from access to Eritrea’s ports. It is an unfortunate state of affairs that needs but a little movement on the part of Ethiopia.

Of course any movement will not change the facts of history that show Eritrea is not a part of Ethiopia, and its ports, even less so.

1. Reid, Richard; “The Challenge of the past: The Quest for Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea”; History of Africa; Vol. 28 (2001
2. White, Philip; “Briefing: The Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Arbitration”; Review of African Political Economy; Vol. 29, No. 92 (2002
3. Algiers Agreement, signed 12 December 2000 Between Eritrea and Ethiopia
4. Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission Rules of Procedure
5. Statement of the Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission, 27 November 2006
6. Annex to the Statement of the Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission, 27 November 2006

These parties ranged from the secular to sectarian, from nationalist to unionist. Indeed part of the purpose for encouraging such a system in Eritrea was to encourage the various polities within Eritrea. In particular the British secretly held an agenda to commit the western lowlands of Eritrea to their holdings in the Sudan and the balance to its ally Ethiopia.¹ By the late 1940s however it had become clear that the United Nations was to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia and the political parties coalesced into two groups, an Independence (nationalist) Bloc and a Unionist (loyal to the Emperor) Bloc.

These two groups jockeyed for power, however the deck was stacked against the Independence Bloc by de facto control of the National Police by the Unionists, evidenced by the multiple acts of attempted and successful assassinations of Independence Bloc leaders. The Ethiopian elites in both politics and the clergy (the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Muslims were not considered for high office) saw the imminent Federation as little more than a trial period before the inevitable Ethiopian absorption of the Eritrean State. It was to this end that they conspired with the British to split Eritrea between the Eritrean highlands and lowlands to Ethiopia and the Sudan, respectively.² This was a matter that the Independence Bloc was wholly opposed to and issued a statement as such.¹ This was eventually taken off the table, however, due to gross inconsistencies in the elections held by the British Military Administration, the Independence Bloc was overruled in its statement and the Federal arrangement was chosen for Eritrea.³

Of course it was this Federation that was undertaken by Haile Selassie in which Ethiopians can build their strongest claim to sovereignty over Eritrean ports. In the Federal Act⁴ Ethiopia was given exclusive jurisdiction to the ports. Of course this privilege implies that had the Federal arrangement not existed Ethiopia would not have this privilege. This is an important point as to this day there are Ethiopians who contend that Ethiopians his owed a port. As was seen PREVIOUSLY (LINK TO PREVIOUS POST), any pre-colonial claim to the ports by Ethiopia holds little evidentiary validity. Of course it was partially because of the tenuous nature of this link that in 1962, Haile Selassie forced the dissolution of the Eritrean Parliament and officially (not to be misread as legally) annexed Eritrea. Both of these acts were illegal as the institution of the Parliament and the Federal arrangement were enshrined in the Federal Act and neither the Eritrean Parliament, or the Emperor was empowered to amend it.⁵⁶ Adding insult to injury, it has become clear that the vote that was to have dissolved the Parliament never took place; In its place, a statement, in Amharic (a tongue not officially recognized by the Eritrean Parliament), declaring the dissolution of the Federation.⁷⁸

Of course in this discussion the importance of the dissolution of the Eritrean Federal State are a result of what occurred after annexation. At that time Eritrea was declared the 14th province of Ethiopia. The critical component here is that the borders of this province remained unchanged from the Federal arrangement. The consequence of this is that the ports remained a part of the annexed state and not merged into nearby states. Now at this point in time however, Eritreans were already fighting for the independence of the state. Since the year before, 1 September 1961, Eritreans had taken up arms against the Ethiopian state and its gradual removal of Eritrean independence.

This revolt would last much longer than Ras Woldemicheal’s however, its outcome would be wholly different as well. Next we will take a look at how the current leader of Ethiopia, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, affected the issues of the ports and border.

1. Yohannes, Oakbazghi; Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics; 1991
2. Iyob, Ruth; The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism, 1941-1993; (1997)
3. Cliffe, Lionel; Davidson, Basil; The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace; (1988)
4. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 390 (V)
5. Cliffe, Lionel; Davidson, Basil; The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace; (1988)
6. Selassie, Bereket Habte; Eritrea and the United Nations and Other Essays; (1989)
7.  Cliffe, Lionel; Davidson, Basil; The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace; (1988)
8. Selassie, Bereket Habte; Eritrea and the United Nations and Other Essays; (1989)

The boundaries between Eritrea and Ethiopia were fixed four times:

• 1889 (Treaty of Wuchale) abrogated and replaced in 1896 (Treaty of Addis Ababa),
• 1900 (identified the boundary western and central portion of the boundary between Eritrea and Ethiopia),
• 1902 (a modification of the 1900 treaty dealing primarily with central part of the boundary), and
• 1908 (identified the boundary in the east).

Although his reign was relatively brief, Emperor Menelik was partially responsible for deconstructing the myth of Ethiopian boundaries. As a result of the above mentioned treaties, it became clear that Emperor Menelik did not consider the land north of the Mereb to be a part of Ethiopia. This is in some measure to be expected as he was not in fact a typical Emperor, in fact he is one of the few who were in fact Oromo (specifically Shoan).¹) The lack of interest in Eritrea by a Shoan is likely caused by proximity, or in this case lack thereof, considering that the regions of Tigray and even Gonder are far closer than Shoa to Eritrea.

Of course not all developments related to the boundary with Eritrea and more relavant to this series, to the ports, were a product of his Imperial power. During the 1870s he had made agreements as the King of Shoa to trade through the Italian port of Asseb.² Further, he in 1887 signed a secret agreement with Italy, essentially recognizing that Abyssinia had no sovereignty over Eritrea.² These two agreements together identify an understanding that the Eritrean ports are not territorially important to Ethiopia, or at the very least Shoa, as they can be accessed through agreements. Of course this possibility has always existed, a topic which will be discussed more in the final (part 4) of this series but it is important to note that Menelik recognized this option.

1. Reid, Richard; “The Challenge of the past: The Quest for Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea”; History of Africa; Vol. 28 (2001
2. Yohannes, Oakbazghi; Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics; 1991

To understand why this recurring myth continues to rear its head after 20 years of Eritrean Independence and over 500 years since Ethiopia had nearly unrestricted use of the Port, it is important to take a very careful look at the policies and myths promoted by the rulers of Ethiopia. To that end let us exam four cases, Emperor Yohannes, Emperor Haile Selassie, Mengistu Hailemariam, Meles Zenawi.

First to clarify a some terminology.

• Ethiopia will be used in the context of the modern state (including the regions occupied by the Oromo and Ogadeni peoples’),
• Abyssinia will refer to the northern highlands of Ethiopia,
• Mereb Mellash will be a reference to the lands on the “other side of the Mereb” which in contemporary geography refers to Eritrea.

Now to understand the main point of the discussion we obviously have to understand the historical context of the region. First it is important to understand that Mereb Mellash is not synonymous with Abyssinia. In fact, their traditional forms of government are at odds with one another.² The decentralized nature of Eritrean systems versus the highly centralized, monarchial forms of government prevalent in Ethiopia are fundamentally opposed to one another. Similarly these two systems of governance have led to the different natures of the polities. The Eritrean polities remained small and locally engaged as a result of their consensual decision-making processes which also resulted in tempered policies while in Ethiopia the highly centralized structure focused on a singular entity led to wild swings in policy and temperment.

By the mid 19th century, Ethiopia and Egypt were locked in a decades long war to determine who would hold what the Ottomans had for so long. As the Ottoman empire began to collapse the shores of the Red Sea and the Eritrean Sahel were up for grabs. In 1884 the Hewett Treaty was signed between Egypt, the UK and Ethiopia. Amongst the requirements of the treaty were:

• Egyptian withdrawal from Keren (to whom control would fall was not addressed),
• Tax free trade through the Port of Massawa for Ethiopia (however, control of the Port itself would remain elsewhere), and
• That the region of Bogos would be ceded to Ethiopia.

This final point is critical because it speaks to the important recognition by the Eritrean population that they were not a part of the Ethiopian nation. When it became clear in 1876 that the decades long conflict between the Egyptians and Ethiopians could be coming to an end and Eritreans would be given to Ethiopia, the population rose up. In July, Ras Woldemicheal raised an army and struck back at the Ethiopians without Egyptian assistance. In a bloody battle his forces dispatched the Ethiopian garrison and moved south liberate up to the Mereb. Astonished at the Eritrean audacity the Emperor of Ethiopia focused the whole of his forces on this new force and forced them back to Bogos.³ The passion for an unoccupied Eritrea continued to burn, albeit quietly. Similarly, on what would soon be the Ethiopian boundary with Colonial Eritrea, the sleepy village of Asseb was about to change hands.

In 1869 (negotiations ended in 1870) an Italian shipping company bought the port and coastline of Asseb (south eastern Eritrea) from the local rulers.⁴ Although nominally a part of Ethiopia these pastoralists remained independent until the last century. At the time of purchase, it should be noted, that Asseb was little more than a fishing village, it was not until the 1880′s.⁵ Of course, by this time the time of Emperor Yohannes was drawing to a close, though what manifested during his rule would mark the history books forever, he set in motion what would be the official demarcation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, laying to rest the question of the border. The boundaries would be finally fixed on paper by Emperor Menelik II, which we will look at next, in part 2.

1. Ethiopia must take back Eritrea’s Assab port says Opposition leader Yacob
2. Relevance of African Traditional Forms of Governance
3. Yohannes, Oakbazghi; Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics; 1991
4. Ring, Trudy; Watson, Noelle; Schellinger, Paul;International Dictionary of Historic Places: Middle East and Africa, 1996
5. Ring, Trudy; Watson, Noelle; Schellinger, Paul;International Dictionary of Historic Places: Middle East and Africa, 1996

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”¹ [emphasis mine]

This brazen disregard for the binding international agreement is ironically not dissimilar from the same disregard the Government of Ethiopia has shown for the binding agreement signed with Eritrea regarding the demarcation of their common boundary.²

Given the continued tone of aggression that Ethiopia has shown towards Eritrea, particularly that referenced above, it is unsurprising that Eritrea, a country 1/20th the size of Ethiopia must prepare for all eventualities. If physical aggression is the next step explored by Ethiopia, the Government of Eritrea would be remiss if it had not prepared to counter such aggression. However, given the arms embargo placed upon it by the United Nations, the Government of Eritrea has been placed in the position of having to choose between complying with the United Nations directive or protecting its people and sovereignty.

Given these two options, the latter would likely take precedence if the Government prioritized the safety of its citizens and means, otherwise the former would take precedence. These future possibilities will likely be based on whether or not:

• Ethiopia takes steps to walk back its unwarranted escalation of tension in the region, and/or
• the United Nations Security Council lifts restrictions on the import of arms for Eritrea, and/or
• the United Nations Security Council sanctions Ethiopia for either:
  • its threat of aggression against a fellow member state, and/or
  • its disregard of treaty obligations per the above referenced Algiers Agreement (2000).

1. UN Charter – Article 2
2. 2000 Algiers Agreement

Unfortunately of course the author continues, and makes what in my opinion is a fatal error. In particular the one that I am sure that everyone here would find frustrating if not offensive (of which I am of the latter). I quote below the entirety of discussion related to the evidence:

There are, in the post?colonial history of Africa, two great examples of self?determination, of the creation of a new state from a previously independent African state: Eritrea was the first; South Sudan is the second. No state in history has agreed to cessation of a part. Cessation is always forced on a state. This is why we need to ask a question in both cases: how was cessation possible?

Eritrean self?determination was the outcome of two important developments, internal and external. Internally, it was the outcome of a struggle lasting nearly four decades, culminating in a military victory over the Mengistu regime, the Derg. Externally, the relevant factor was the end of the Cold War.

The referendum that followed was notable for one reason. In spite of the close relation between Eritrean and Ethiopian armed movements, the EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front) and the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), and their joint victory over the Ethiopian empire state, the Eritrean people voted overwhelmingly to establish a separate and independent state.

The factual errors embodied herein are a result of laziness and an uncritical eye to the specifics of the evidence. In particular Eritrea was not a new state create from a previously independent state. Although Eritrea could be said to be a new independent state in Africa (owing to the fact that the state itself was not a single entity prior to colonialism, although few parts of it were part of Ethiopia from 1876 to 1890).

The Eritrean referendum was notable for a good deal more than the fact that the Eritrean people voted overwhelmingly for independence². I mean seriously, 99.8% is amazing!

Finally, I find the mockery of the actual events difficult, the EPLF and TPLF (EPRDF) were certainly not in any measure equals, neither in the political/economic sphere or military sphere. The entities were wholly different in both comprehensiveness and maturity.

I think we can all agree here, although the conclusion of the piece does bring some interesting conclusions and questions.

1. Transcript from talk given on 17 March 2011
2. Eritrea’s Referendum on Independence